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Abstract
Secret sharing based systems can provide both data secrecy and recoverability simul-
taneously. This is achieved by a special cryptographical splitting of the data, where the
parts, called shares, are distributed among a group of entities. A classical solution would
be to first encrypt the data (confidentiality), then to copy and store the result for backup
(recoverability). However, by using a secret sharing system, the complete data can be
recovered even when only a sufficiently sized subset of shares can be supplied, while any
smaller subset of shares does not leak any information about the original data (perfect se-
crecy). For instance, the shares can be distributed across several distinct cloud providers,
thus enabling a secure and recoverable storage. Following this idea, we design and pro-
pose a novel application for secure and recoverable management of personal passwords
by distributing secret shares to cloud storage entities. We have made an experimental
smartphone implementation that validates the expediency of the design. The Android ap-
plication implementation distributes the shares to three cloud providers (Dropbox, Google
Drive and Microsoft OneDrive). We note that several mobile password managers exist,
but they mostly use the classical solution of encrypted data for storage.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Authentication is the most popular method to allow access to resources and services. Despite
the tremendous effort to replace the usage of passwords by introducing other mechanisms (e.g.:
electronic tokens, one-time keys, biometrics), passwords remain the most common, but also
the most vulnerable factor in a personal authentication process. This might be caused by
the implementation of the password authentication itself, but very often is caused by bad
practices at the user’s side. A common method to alleviate people’s problem of remembering
many passwords is to use the same password for multiple platforms. To prevent people from
using this and other bad practices, the very practical question of how to securely manage all
our private passwords comes naturally. A solution can be a password manager, which should
provide at least confidentiality of the stored passwords and recoverability in case of incidents
and faults.
1.2 Contribution
The contributions presented in this paper are based on the Android application design and
implementation described in Elle’s master’s thesis work [5], where we investigated the usability
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Figure 1: A password is divided in three shares, where each share is stored in a cloud; Recon-
struction is possible from any two out of three shares
of secret sharing for password storage, as an alternative to the classical solution that requires
both encryption (for data confidentiality) and backup (for data recoverability). Unlike this
classical backup method that creates copies, secret sharing does not increase the risk of exposure,
but facilitates secrecy by dividing trust between multiple entities. This approach is thus a
possible solution for secure distributed cloud storage, where the clouds are located with distinct
providers.
Even though the concept of secret sharing has been around for almost 40 years now and
has been considered for long-term secure storage, it has been given very little attention for
password storage. By using the concept of storing by secret sharing, and implementing it in
a mobile application, one could create an application that acts like the conventional password
storage manager while providing a solution that is information-theoretically secure. Considering
secret sharing as a basic for a distributed personal password repository and implementing a
working Android experimental application for sharing passwords among cloud providers brings
novelty to this work. This particular application distributes secret shares among three clouds
(Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft OneDrive) in a theoretically-secure manner. Using
Shamir’s threshold secret scheme, we obtain recoverability from any two out of three shares.
See Figure 1 for a schematic representation of password sharing and reconstruction.
In our literature survey, we found only one other mobile application that uses secret sharing
for password management [21]. That Android application is apparently under development, but
with no software update since 2016. Moreover, its design does not distribute the shares to third
party cloud servers, but to other personal devices, which makes that application’s functionality
dependent on the availability of the personal devices at any given time.
1.3 Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section introduces the theoretical back-
ground in terms of secret sharing and the two different approaches for secure storage. Section
3 introduces the implementation background in terms of clouds usage and connectivity, as well
as some basic Android implementation notions. Section 4 presents the experimental Android
application that implements the distributed password repository among clouds. Last section
concludes.
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2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is a method to divide a secret into parts, called shares that are distributed
among a group of entities such that the secret can only be reconstructed when an authorized
set of participants combine their shares. Individual shares or combinations of shares belonging
to unauthorized sets of participants do not reveal the secret. A large variety of secret sharing
schemes exist in the literature and are classified based on the secrecy level they guarantee for
unauthorized sets, the structure of the authorized sets, the type of the algorithms used for
generating the shares or reconstructing the secret, and others.
We will only describe Shamir’s scheme [16] here because it satisfies the necessities for our
work, and it is further used in the implementation. It is a threshold secret sharing scheme,
which means that the secret can be reconstructed from any set of at least k shares, where k is
a given threshold. This implies redundancy directly: if at least k shares remain accessible, the
secret can be reconstructed even if the other shares are lost or destroyed. Moreover, Shamir’s
scheme is perfectly secure, which means that, theoretically, less than k shares reveal absolutely
no information about the secret. Shamir’s scheme is based on the fact that a (k − 1)-degree
polynomial f(x) is uniquely defined by (at least) k distinct pairs (x, f(x)). In the sharing
phase, the free coefficient is set to the value of the secret, and the rest of the coefficients of the
polynomial are randomly chosen modulo q, where q is a large prime number. Notice that the
secret itself must lie in Zq = {0, . . . , q− 1}, because it is also acts like a coefficient. This might
seem a limitation, but is not the case, because any sequence of bits can be encoded into one
or more values in Zq that can be shared independently. The i-th share is simply set to f(i),
the value of the polynomial in i. Reconstruction is possible from any k (or more) shares by
polynomial interpolation.
2.2 Secure Storage Types
The classical solution for secure storage assumes strong encryption, and so decryption becomes
computationally infeasible in the absence of the decryption key. This means that the data
remains confidential to any adversary with bounded computational power that gains access to
the ciphertext. Contrastingly, a solution that uses a perfect secret sharing scheme (such as
Shamir’s) maintains confidentiality against any adversary, even with unbounded computational
power, under the assumption that the adversary can gain access to up to k − 1 shares.
The classical solution uses backup or other replication mechanisms to assure data redun-
dancy in case of incidents and faults, while threshold secret sharing based solutions provide
data recoverability by construction: the data can be fully reconstructed as long as a minimal
number of shares (equal to the threshold) are accessible.
For a more detailed comparison of the two approaches, see [17, 18, 15]. Although many solu-
tions for long-term data storage that use secret sharing mechanisms have been proposed in the
literature, surprisingly few investigations have been done to employ secret sharing mechanisms
for passwords management.
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3 Implementation Background
3.1 Clouds
Three of the major cloud storage providers on the market today are Dropbox, Google Drive
and Microsoft OneDrive [1]. They provide from 2 to 15 GB of free storage. Using an API
(Application Programming Interface), an application can interconnect to a cloud by sending
and receiving data in a secure manner, using encryption for the data in transit [20]. All the
three mentioned clouds use the standard OAuth 2.0 authentication scheme, a framework that
enables applications to obtain limited access to resources, without the users having to share
their log-in credentials with the application [11].
In our implementation, the clouds are used to store the shares. The amount of necessarily
storage space occupied by the shares is very small compared to the overall free storage space
of a user, so there is no negative impact with respect to storage capacity. Storing the shares
to the cloud does not introduce any additional costs and in principle, gives the user high
flexibility in selecting its own preferable providers. Although the experimental work of the
current application allows connectivity to the above-mentioned clouds only, in principle the
application can be extended to allow connectivity to other cloud providers as well.
The code used for connecting to the Dropbox API is provided by the Dropbox Core SDK
(Software Development Kit) for Java 6+ [3]. Similarly, the code used for connecting to the
OneDrive API for Android is provided by the sample code from the OneDrive SDK [13], while
the code used for connecting to the Google Drive API for Android is provided by Google [2].
3.2 Android
Android is an open-source mobile OS (Operating System) owned by Google [10]. The popularity
of Android devices (approximately 69% of the global market in April 2018 [14]) and the ease
to program makes it a good choice for developing mobile applications.
The Android Studio is the official Integrated Development Environment (IDE), providing
tools for building applications for all Android devices [7].
The security mechanisms for Android includes code signing, application isolation, permission
model, file system encryption, and other security protections. The purpose of the code signing
is to prove the source of the software, by signing the application with the developer’s private
key, and only allowing updates to be made if the signature can be verified. Furthermore, each
Android application resides in its own security sandbox, which isolates the application data and
code execution from other applications [8]. If the application needs to use resources outside of
the sandbox, the application has to request permission. The permissions are declared by listing
them in the manifest file [9].
Note that this work did not go through all steps required for releasing an application because
our Android experimental application was considered for testing purposes in a limited environ-
ment. The application was made available for download outside the Play Store. The manifest
file includes access to the Internet, the network state, reading and writing to the external stor-
age, and managing access to documents. It also contains additional metadata, such as the API
key for the Google API and the authentication activity for Dropbox with the application key.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of the application; left: welcome screen; middle: creating a new application
password; right: log-in screen
4 The Application
The distributed password repository is implemented in the shape of an Android application
that uses Shamir’s secret sharing scheme with threshold k = 2. The application divides each
password into three shares and distributes each to three different cloud providers (Dropbox,
Google Drive and Microsoft OneDrive). Android Studio has been used in the developing process,
and the connectivity to the clouds was performed as previously explained.
4.1 Functionality
We describe next the basic functionality of the experimental implementation in terms of user
actions and results. We keep in mind that our fundamental goal is not to describe the imple-
mentation itself, but to consider secret sharing as a basis for a distributed personal password
repository, so we also mention capabilities that have not been implemented in the application,
improvements and future work.
Login. After the welcome screen (or splash screen), the user is either asked to introduce a
password (if no application password has been set before), or to log-in by typing the correct
password. When a new password is introduced, a progress bar gives an indication of its strength.
The evaluation is based on the length of the password, as well as the number of symbols, digits,
uppercase and lowercase letters. Afterwards, the login screen is prompted every time the
application is launched, to create an extra barrier for a potential attacker. This would disallow
for example direct access to the application to someone that has physical access to the phone.
Figure 2 illustrates related screenshots of the application.
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Figure 3: Screenshot of the application; left: drop-down menu when one cloud is connected,
middle: drop-down menu when two clouds are connected, right: drop-down menu when all
clouds are connected
Connectivity to the clouds. The entry point of the application is the connection status
screen, displayed after the user is successfully logged in. Is here where the user has an overview
of whether it is connected or disconnected to the clouds, and also if there is Internet connectivity.
For each cloud there is displayed a login button. The login buttons contain the names and icons
for the clouds, in accordance with the guidelines for branding [4, 12, 6]. If the user is not logged
to any cloud, then all of the login buttons are visible and all the clouds are marked with a red
cross. When the user logs to any of them (using his personal credentials), the red cross changes
to a green tick symbol, indicating that the application is connected to the cloud. If so, the login
button becomes invisible. Figure 3 illustrates related screenshots of the application.
The elements in the drop-down menu change depending on how many clouds are connected.
If none, the user only has access to change the password for the application. If at least one
cloud is connected, the user can in addition log out from the clouds. If at least two clouds are
connected, the user can reconstruct passwords. Only when all clouds are connected, the user
has full functionality and can store a new password. The restriction of storing a password only
when all clouds are up is to achieve redundancy: a password can be recovered from any two
shares, but the splitting is done in three shares. Of course, this is a particular implementation,
which is somehow hardcoded. To properly allow flexibility, the user might choose the overall
number of shares and the threshold needed for reconstruction. But the implementation should
be done with care, do disallow the user to poorly parametrize (e.g.: to get no redundancy).
Store a password. To store a new password, the user needs to press the Create new password
button in the drop-down menu. This action redirects to a new screen, as shown in Figure 4.
Here, the platform name field corresponds to the system the password is used for, e.g. ”Face-
book”, and the password field is the password to be stored. When the save button is pressed, a
pop-up is prompted to confirm the action. The application will split the password into shares
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Figure 4: Screenshot of the application; left: create new password, middle: filled in platform
name and password, right: pop-up for confirmation
and distribute to each cloud a share titled with the platform name, which can be later used to
reconstruct the password. Again, an implementation decision has been made here not to hide
the name of the platform, assuming that only the password protection is important. Of course,
to some extend the platforms themselves can be considered private, as they disclose something
about the user behavior, so the name of the shares should be independent of the platform name.
This can easily be achieved by keeping a file that matches the names of the platforms to random
or generic sequences. These sequences are then used for naming the shares in the clouds, and
the matching file can be stored split between the clouds by secret sharing. Each reconstruction
would then additionally imply first the reconstruction of the matching file, and only after the
reconstruction of the password by the corresponding shares. In the absence of this matching
file, a similar file containing just the names of the platforms can be stored in the clouds in case
of the phone is stolen, lost or dysfunctional and the user needs to reinstall the application on
another device and restore the passwords. This is what we call the backup file.
Reconstruct a password. To reconstruct a password, the user needs to press the Retrieve
passwords button in the drop-down menu. This action redirects to a new screen that contains
a list of the stored passwords, as shown in Figure 5. The user selects the platform’s name that
corresponds to the password he wants to recover and confirms in the pop-up window. This
triggers the reconstruction of the password from shares, using the secret sharing scheme.
Deleting a password. To delete a password, the user needs to click on the platform name
and hold it for a short while before a pop-up with a warning message is displayed. After the
user confirms deletion, the application triggers the deletion of all the shares belonging to the
given password in the clouds.
Figure 6 is an overall representation of the activities and the options shown to the user. On
the Android platform, an activity serves as the entry point for an applications interaction with
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Figure 5: Screenshot of the application; left: retrieve passwords, middle: pop-up asking if the
user wants to retrieve the chosen password, left: the password retrieved
Figure 6: An overall representation of the activities and menu options shown to the user
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the user. The implementation contains six activities visible to the user, which are illustrated
in the figure.
Completing the design. One could immediately observe the absence of the usernames here.
Even if usually the username is easier to remember (e.g.: the e-mail address), the user should not
be asked to remember them, but they must be managed by the password manager application
too. This could be simply solved by concatenating the username to the password (for instance
delimited by a space) before sharing. This is if the application prototype implementation is to
be followed. A simpler approach would be to store all platforms’ names, together with their
associated usernames and passwords, in a single file that is to be shared between the clouds.
This would imply the storage of a single share (of larger size) to each cloud. Each time a new
password needs to be stored, the whole file is reconstructed, the new string (platform-name,
username, password) is appended to the file and the new version is secret shared, updating
the new shares to the clouds. A similar procedure should be followed in case of deletion of
passwords. Of course, this solution would require a higher computational cost for a single
password storage or deletion, but it should not introduce a significant overload, so it should not
affect the usability of the application. It would also eliminate the need of a backup or matching
file, and it would keep private the platforms’ names by design. For any of the solutions, a
versioning system should be put in place, and timestamp of all performed actions must be
available.
4.2 Sharing and Reconstruction
An available java implementation was used as a base for the secret sharing algorithm [19].
A 384-bit prime q is used for the split and reconstruction operations, and the password is
encoded to an integer in Zq. As already mentioned, this is not a limitation because the password
string can be broken into smaller pieces that lie in Zq. Anyway, this should not be the case,
because no usable password can exceed 48 characters in length.
Share a password. To split a password into shares, a method called splitSecretIntoPieces is
called with parameters the password secret, the total number of secrets n and the number of
shares required for reconstruction k. The return value is a string array containing the shares,
that will later be distributed to the clouds. Listing 1 shows the splitting of the password into
shares.
Listing 1: Splitting password into shares, code from UploadSharesTask.java file
// S p l i t password i n t o shares .
f ina l St r ing s e c r e t ;
s e c r e t = [THE PASSWORD] ;
f ina l int n = 3 , k = 2 ;
S t r ing [ ] p i e c e s = s p l i t S e c r e t I n t o P i e c e s ( s e c r e t , n , k ) ;
Reconstruct a password. To reconstruct the password, a method mergePiecesIntoSecret
is called with parameter a string array obtained from the shares used for reconstruction. As
an implementation example, Listing 2 shows the scenario where the password is reconstructed
when all three shares are used.
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Figure 7: The overall score of the user tests: ”PASSED” 98,2% and ”FAILED” 1,8%
Listing 2: Retrieving password, code from RetrieveActivity.java file
S t r ing [ ] p i e c e s = new St r ing [ 3 ] ;
p i e c e s [ 0 ] = [ OneDrive SHARE ] ;
p i e c e s [ 1 ] = [ Dropbox SHARE ] ;
p i e c e s [ 2 ] = [ Google Drive SHARE ] ;
// Create a r r a y l i s t out o f the format ted s t r i n g s ,
// s h u f f l e and r e c o n s t r u c t s e c r e t .
List<Str ing> l i s t = new ArrayList<Str ing >(Arrays . a s L i s t ( p i e c e s ) ) ;
C o l l e c t i o n s . s h u f f l e ( l i s t ) ;
S t r ing [ ] kPieces = l i s t . toArray (new St r ing [ 0 ] ) ;
f ina l St r ing r e cons t ruc t ed = mergeP iece s IntoSec re t ( kPieces ) ;
4.3 Testing and Feedback
An evaluation was conducted to measure how well the application performed while being used by
regular users. The users were able, and encouraged, to comment on the application’s interface
and behavior. The aim was to have a focus group of five subjects, preferably with various
degrees of technical skills.
The subjects were given a test sheet containing 70 steps that covered all aspects of the
functionality, including for example logging in, storing and recovering passwords. The users
gave each functionality a score of ”PASSED” or ”FAILED”, where ”PASSED” means that the
application responded as described in the test sheet, and ”FAILED” means that there were
some deviations from the description in the test sheet. By evaluating these tests, a quantitative
score, the overall score, was used to describe how well the application performs. Figure 7 shows
the overall score of the user test, with a ”PASSED” score of 98,2%. The comments provided
by the users served as inputs for further development and improvement of the application.
The sharing and reconstruction of the secret is performed fast and hence introduces no
disturbing delay for the user. Therefore, from a performance point of view there was no negative
feedback with respect to the response time of the application.
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5 Conclusions
The paper presents a distributed personal password repository prototype that uses secret shar-
ing implemented in the form of an Android experimental application. The usage of secret shar-
ing as an alternative solution for password storage brings novelty. By using Shamir’s threshold
secret sharing, the application provides redundancy by default. In the presented implemen-
tation, two out of three shares are required for reconstruction, but a more flexible approach
might allow the user to parametrize the overall number of shares, as well as the shares required
for reconstruction. Also, flexibility should be added to allow connectivity to other clouds. In
a complete version, usernames must be stored for each platform together with the passwords,
and a versioning system could be set into place.
As a risk, there is a certain chance that the shares can be deleted outside the application,
directly from the cloud. If this is the case, and the remaining shares are below the reconstruction
threshold, then reconstruction is not possible and an error message is displayed.
A testing of the functionalities of the implementation was performed. The goal was not
to test the security of the application, but mostly its functionalities and usability. Therefore,
future work includes an in-depth security evaluation of the implementation. Furthermore,
enhancements on the privacy should be considered. For example, this includes the secrecy of
the names of the platforms the user has accounts for, which to some extent represent private
information too.
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